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 Direct and indirect ways of managing epistemic asymmetries when eliciting 
memories. 
Abstract 
This article aims to explore how epistemic status is negotiated during talk about the life 
memories of one speaker.  Direct questions which foreground ‘remembering’ can lead to 
troubled sequences of talk. However, interlocutors sometimes frame their first parts as ‘co-
rememberings’, and the sequential positioning of these can be crucial to the outcome of the 
talk. We draw on almost 10 hours of video data from dementia settings, where memory is a 
talked-about matter. Our focus is on 30 sequences which are initiated with a question or 
other first part taking a K- stance, selecting one person as next speaker, and topically 
relating to the recipient’s past life. We show how Type Two knowables can be used 
alongside markers of tentativeness, to jointly construct the recipient’s epistemic primacy.  
Key words Epistemics, epistemic primacy, co-remembering, dementia, questions, 
reminiscence, Type Two knowables, asymmetries in talk, support practices. 
  
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
Co-remembering or referring to a shared past event is a mundane, routine practice in which 
we all regularly engage, and can be used for various social goals (Bolden and Mandelbaum, 
2017; You, 2015). At the same time, talk about past experience or memories can be deeply 
linked with identity, ‘a co-constructed performance of self’ (Crichton and Koch, 2011) and 
remembering takes on a particular significance for some people with acquired impairments, 
in the face of a loss of the narrative of one’s life.  This is particularly true of people with 
dementia whose interactions with others may help to maintain their worth and identity 
(Cowdell, 2006), creating ‘personhood’ (Kitwood, 1997), goals which are articulated in 
English dementia policy (Department of Health, 2015).  
The focus of this article is the sequential effect of first parts which are designed to elicit the 
personal life memories of the recipient, and over which a speaker would be expected to have 
epistemic primacy (Raymond and Heritage, 2006).  It is a delicate task to design questions in 
such a way that this primacy is respected, especially when the respondent’s own account 
lacks detail or specificity. Moreover, the questioner may in fact already know that detail, and 
has to manage the potential threat of that knowledge to the respondent. In this situation, 
there are various options open to the questioner, and we explore the sequential effects of a) 
indirect questions which focus on memory, such as ‘Do you remember?’; b) direct questions 
where the questioner claims that they are ‘knowledge minus’ (Heritage, 2010; 2012) in 
respect of the personal memories of the respondent; c) indirect routes where a speaker lays 
claim either to generic topical information, or to previous conversational disclosure from the 
other person. All these strategies in some senses make memory itself a talked-about topic, 
and the act of remembering (or recalling) a jointly constructed activity, often prompted by the 
person with dementia’s conversation partner. However, in some instances the possibility of 
not remembering is built into the formulation of the question, creating threats to the ‘face 
wants’ (Goffman, 1967) and identity of the respondent. We were therefore particularly 
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interested to look for strategies which might create a more symmetrical and equal interaction 
between the two parties.  
In this paper we analyse data from dementia groups, where reminiscence and talk about the 
past is ‘on the agenda’. Older people have a rich resource of past memories to draw on 
when conducting a conversation (Boden and Bielby, 1986) and regularly interweave past 
and present in order to negotiate conversation topics, and to manage interpersonal aspects 
of conversation such as affiliation. Instead of examining identity as a personal characteristic, 
this article follows the tradition of Antaki and Widdicombe (1998) to consider how identity 
becomes relevant on a moment-by-moment basis in talk. As we shall show in this article, 
past identity claims can co-exist alongside threats to present identity status in reminiscence 
talk. Middleton (1997) for instance discusses how people are co-opted into the act of 
remembering, and how the relevance of certain memories can be negotiated in talk. There 
has long been interest in how these rights to manage identity in talk are eroded when 
speakers are treated as ‘confused’ (Shakespeare, 1998) with less than full membership 
rights as conversational partners and dependent on ‘how others perceive and interact with 
them’ (Crichton and Koch, 2011: 102). 
This article positions both identity and memory as phenomena that are ‘talked into being’ 
(Goodwin, 1987; Shaw and Kitzinger, 2007: 119). As Heritage (2012) has pointed out, 
participants in interaction regularly orient to each person’s privileged epistemic status, or 
their right to their own memories (‘epistemic primacy’: Raymond and Heritage, 2006), 
although in routine conversation, epistemic access to any topic is relative, often shared, and 
shifting (Heritage, 2012: 4). As will be explored, it is those moments of sharing which seem 
key to the successful completion of memory talk in these contexts. We point therefore to a 
phenomenon which is of very general relevance to the task of managing respect for 
epistemic primacy. 
When talking with a person known to have dementia, we found that memory was often a 
foregrounded matter, and that the possibility of not remembering was frequently built into the 
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formulation of questions about the life memories of the person with dementia. We are 
particularly interested in the epistemic status of each speaker, and how routine ways of 
managing epistemic asymmetries are managed in this context. Our goal in this analysis is to 
distinguish the precise ways in which a successful conversation about another person’s past 
life could be achieved without undermining his or her epistemic rights and current identity 
status.  
2. Questions  
Questions are one of the bedrocks of conversation sequences, typically in initiating position, 
and often a mark of the institutional rights of one participant in the interaction; as Hayano 
(2013: 395) comments, ‘questions are a powerful tool to control interaction: they pressure 
recipients for response, impose presuppositions, agendas and preferences…’. There are 
many institutional practices which are constructed precisely by their reliance on question-
response sequences (Stokoe and Edwards, 2010 on police interrogations; Antaki, Houtkoop-
Steenstra and Rapley, 2000, on the delivery of survey questions; Clayman and Heritage, 
2002, on news interviews). Some of these practices display particular patterns of question-
answer which define the event for participants (Sidnell, 2010). Specifically, Sidnell highlights 
the strategy used regularly by interrogators, where they follow up an initial yes/no question 
with further topically related probes. 
The types of questions we focus on here regularly fulfil the function which Schegloff (1980) 
refers to as a ‘pre’, or a preliminary to a larger action - a way of ensuring that the other party 
understands and recognises the reference. As Williams (2011: 65-74) notes, a routine way 
of bringing someone into the conversation is to refer to shared memories or joint 
experiences. This type of opening reference can be done in fact by the use of declaratives, 
without necessarily using typical question formats (Sidnell, 2010). A candidate 
understanding, or an other-initiated repair for clarification, can also serve as a way of offering 
someone a slot to talk about their own memories (Goodwin, 1987). Crichton and Koch 
(2011: 107) give an example of reminiscence talk with a person with dementia, whose 
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partner creates space for her to ‘remember’ by pausing after a prompt question ‘What’s the 
story about…?’ then giving a more specific prompt when this one fails. By doing this type of 
interactional work, a speaker can position the respondent as someone with shared 
memories, albeit someone who has privileged access to these memories. Questions can 
thus serve multiple functions, and one of the respondent’s problems is to work out, in Ehrlich 
and Freed’s (2010) terms, ‘why do you ask?’ Pomerantz (2017) points out that respondents 
routinely work out what the purpose of the question was, and respond accordingly. 
Responding to a question is not straightforward, and a question designed to open up talk, for 
instance, can easily be misconstrued.   
These matters are discussed in the growing literature where CA is used to examine 
conversations with people with dementia diagnoses (Chatwin, 2014). Kindell et al. (2016) 
review existing studies which examine communication and interactions with people with 
dementia (Lindholm, 2008; 2015 and Lindholm and Wray, 2011). Variously, CA has explored 
some of the repair strategies which are carried out by the non-disabled conversational 
partner (Watson, 1999); the conduct of telephone conversations with a person with dementia 
(Jones, 2015); the use and elicitation of familiar proverbs and sayings by people with 
dementia (Lindholm and Wray, 2011); assessment in memory clinics (Jones et al., 2016).  
All of these studies turn our attention from the deficits of the person with dementia, towards 
the interactional strategies needed within a two-way conversation, by both parties. Wilkinson 
(2008) comments on the importance of the co-constructional role of the conversation partner 
and Jones (2015) for instance comments that some of the routine interactional practices 
which maintain conversation may pose problems when in interaction with someone with 
dementia: “The co-participant in any given conversation will often use ‘ordinary’ interactional 
practices that are straightforward in their everyday interaction, but that are inapposite when 
conversing with someone with memory impairments” (p. 557). Misalignment, as Jones terms 
it, between the two conversational partners can occur not just because of the cognitive 
deficit, but by questions that can be ill-fitted to the competence of the person with dementia.  
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In the following, we shall be particularly interested in the ways in which questions about a 
person’s own life can contain within them particular epistemic claims, and what this might 
imply for the way in which epistemic rights (Raymond and Heritage, 2006) are managed in 
situ. In the light of debates about the validity of epistemics in conversation analysis (Lynch 
and Wong, 2016; Heritage, 2018), we would agree with Heritage that matters of epistemics 
are routinely relevant and observable in talk, and we have ourselves previously argued 
(Williams,  2011) that epistemic primacy (the right which any person has to claim ‘prime’ 
knowledge about one’s own life) is particularly important to analyse when it is under dispute, 
unclear or challenged, a key focus in this paper. We are interested in how both parties in talk 
display accountability towards managing the turn-by-turn assumptions about ‘who knows 
what’.  
3. Method 
The video data on which this paper is based were collected as part of a large (name of 
funder) study on social practices and change in the context of disability. Specifically, this part 
of our project collected in total 9 hours, 57 minutes of naturally occurring data of interactions 
with 28 people with dementia. Although we also collected data from people with intellectual 
disabilities, at home in school or in activity groups, this article focuses solely on the data 
from people with dementia, which were collected largely in activity groups, some of which 
were referred to as ‘memory cafes’. As Chatwin (2014) and Webb (2017), we framed the 
difficulties we observed not as communicative deficits of dementia itself, but more as the 
ways in which interaction could fit or misfit (Garland-Thomson, 2011) the participants in our 
study. In other words, we follow the foundational insights of CA (Sacks, 1987) in considering 
the achievement of smooth interaction as an accomplishment for which both parties have 
responsibility, and we wished to develop ideas about how interaction can be shaped so that 
it supports people with dementia to be conversational partners.  
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The collection of video data was mainly carried out by the second author (Webb) who spent 
many days familiarising himself with the contexts, and becoming a known participant in the 
groups. Any study like this will have ethical issues to overcome, and our study followed a 
strict protocol approved by (Name of Ethics Committee), to ensure that people assessed as 
lacking capacity to consent on their own behalf had personal consultees who could give 
consent on their behalf. Permission to record events or conversations was always sought at 
the time, and so consent was continually re-negotiated with all participants. Additionally, 
participants were invited to take part in feedback sessions, where their video material was 
re-played to them and discussed.  
 
The collection of 30 sequences on which this paper is based are all initiated with questions 
which topically relate to the recipient’s past life, and which to varying extents adopt an overt 
knowledge-minus stance.  
 
4. Findings 
 
4.1 ‘Opener’ questions which lead to trouble 
The interactional achievement of reminiscence talk seems unremarkable until it goes wrong. 
Our interest in opening up interactional spaces for reminiscence talk was sparked by one 
such occasion. A frequent form of opener was a ‘Do you remember’ or ‘Can you remember’ 
question, designed to orient the recipient to some aspect of their own experience.  This 
formulation was used for instance when two members of staff (Sandra and Meg) were 
talking with Jim, an older man with dementia.  
 
Extract 1: Can you remember? 
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01   San   I wanted you to tell me a bit about what  
02     you used to do for your ↑jo:↓ob.  
03     (0.8)  
04    San → can you remember  
05     (1)  
06    San  when you were employ:ed what  
07     your job was = 
08   Jim  = £work 
09   San  ££work ↑↑ha ha ha ha [ha 
10   Meg              [did you did you  
11     enjoy it though Jim? did you  
12  Jim   ºyeahº 
13    San  enjoy your work 
 
 
Sandra prefaces her ‘Can you remember’ with an explicit instruction to direct Jim to what he 
should talk about, namely his job, and so the literal form of the question is subordinated to 
this interactional goal. If Jim did not remember what his job was, presumably he could not 
‘tell her a bit’ about it, and so the preferred response to the question in line 4 would be for 
Jim to provide some kind of job classification for himself. Although ‘can you remember?’ has 
the shape of a yes/no question (Raymond, 2003), the phrase operates functionally as an 
indirect preamble to the query about Jim’s job. This is in effect a wh-question (e.g. ‘What 
was your job?’) but designed as an indirect question to account for the possibility that Jim 
will in fact not be able to remember. It should be noted however that the formulation ‘can you 
remember, when you were employed, what your job was’ specifically indexes potential 
memory failure, as contrasted with ‘I wanted you to tell me a bit about what you used to do 
for your job’. The former positions Jim as a potentially unreliable story-teller. Memory 
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becomes a talked-about matter, and thus Sandra orients to Jim’s incompetent identity in the 
here-and-now, creating him as an inadequate interlocutor, in the very act of attempting to 
orient him towards his past professional identity.  
In the event, Jim neither provides the possible literal response of ‘no’ (I don’t remember), 
and nor does he provide a response which would have conformed to the action agenda of 
the question (Hayano, 2013: 402-4) by naming his job, but instead delivers the non-
conforming response ‘work’ with a slight laugh, evident on the video.  Effectively this could 
be heard as a response to Sandra’s opening instruction to ‘tell a bit about his job’, and is 
taken as a joke by Sandra, maybe a way of saving face for Jim.  ‘Work’ could be heard as a 
synonym for the word ‘job’, but also as ‘hard work’ – i.e. Jim’s account of his job. As 
Lindholm (2015) notices, face-saving responses are frequent in such interactional contexts. 
‘Can you remember’ in Extract 1 overtly targets the recipient’s ability to remember. An 
alternative formulation, ‘Do you remember’ could for instance refer to matters outside the 
epistemic domain of the recipient and might function very differently. For instance, ‘do you 
remember’ in that context could be heard as ‘Was this type of thing part of your experience?’ 
to which a relevant response is ‘no’. Conversely, when the matter to be remembered 
specifically relates to the life of the recipient and their ability to remember is called into 
question, as in Extract 1, this can lead to a complex and sensitive negotiation of epistemic 
asymmetries (Stivers et al., 2011). 
4.2  Using a direct question to prompt a response 
Immediately following Extract 1, the conversation with Jim continued. Sandra had already 
responded with laughter to the trouble with which her first question was received, while Meg 
then took up the next question in a more serious tone, marking her distance from the 
laughter by a ‘though’ in the following extract (line 14). We became interested here in how 
the talk moves on towards questions which initially give Jim a tighter framework in which to 
respond, and how both Meg (at line 19) and Sandra (line 29) are led into an 
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acknowledgement that each of them is more ‘K+’ about Jim’s past life than they had initially 
indicated.  
Extract 2 
  
14 Meg  I (know) did you enjoy it though Jim? Did  
15    y[ou] 
16 Jim   [Yeah] 
17 Meg  enjoy your work. 
18 Jim  Yeah= 
19 Meg  =I remember you ↑told me what you used to do ((nodding)) 
20 Jim  .hhh (y[eah)] 
21 San     [What] was your title (0.5) of work 
22    (0.9) 
23 San  What was your title. 
24    (2.4) 
25 Jim  No ti↓tle 
26 San  No title. >So what was the job that you done. 
27     (1.1) 
28 Jim  Engin↑eer 
29 San  Enginee:r. And was that- if I'm right in saying >was that< 
30    for an airconditioning, 
31    (1.1) 
32 Jim  It was, ↑yeah 
33 San  For airconditioning.= 
34 Meg  =Mmm. 
35 Meg  [(I)] 
36 San  [And] that took you: () all over the w↑orld didn't it? 
37 Jim  All over the place 
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38 Meg  Wo:w. 
 
Any question, as Hayano (2013) comments, contains presuppositions. Further, a turn can 
function as a question even when not deploying a question format. Although it is in 
declarative mode, Meg’s ‘I remember you told me’ at line 19 functions as a ‘my side’ 
question (Pomerantz, 1980)  which reinforces the project of ‘Do you remember?’ allocating 
Jim another slot in which to respond. It is also, hearably, a hint to Jim to refer back to what 
he has already said.  Referring to past talk is effectively what Crichton and Koch’s (2011) 
participants also do, in order to continue a past conversation about someone’s own life. The 
explicit ‘I remember you told me’ reverses the ‘Do you remember?’ and positions Meg as 
having explicit knowledge about Jim’s past career, albeit what Pomerantz (1980) called a 
‘type 2 knowable’; Meg does not claim that she has experienced the job itself, and does not 
display yet that she knows exactly what the job was, only that she had been told previously 
(n.b. one may remember that they were told something, without remembering specifics).  
Note also that at this point, none of the parties has actually named Jim’s job. Sandra and 
Meg continue with the next formulation of the question which comes from Sandra, with the 
self-corrected ‘what was your title?’ in lines 21-3. Again, Jim gives a non-conforming 
response, effectively questioning the proposition entailed in the question that his job would 
have had a ‘title’. Repeating this with a smile, Sandra then reformulates the question to 
something very like the opening, now ‘so what was the job that you done?’ Finally this 
produces a response from Jim at line 28 ‘Engineer’.  
Thus far, one can see how the question formats which have been adopted have shifted from 
the generic and less entitled opener ‘I wanted you to tell me’, through to more explicit 
formulations requiring Jim to name his job ‘Can you remember what your job was’ ‘what was 
your title’, and offering him the opportunity to talk around the situation, with a ‘Did you enjoy’. 
Each time the question appears to fail in its interactional goal, it is re-designed and one can 
see how that recipient design is shaped by the particular point reached in the conversation, 
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with trouble, pauses, non-conforming answers and laughter, resulting in a reformulation 
towards something which positions the questioners as incrementally more K+, despite the 
continued push in the questions for Jim to actually articulate his own job role.  
Finally at line 29, as soon as Jim has supplied the word ‘engineer’, Sandra repeats the term, 
a form of third position acknowledgement which functions as an information receipt 
(Schegloff, 1997: 499-545; Svennevig, 2004).  Note that there is no ‘oh-prefacing’ of her 
response, which would be typical for a news receipt, and there is no upward intonation 
(engineer?) which would have suggested a question to be confirmed (Couper-Kuhlen, 2012). 
Without pausing, she immediately increases the specificity of the question to Jim, drawing on 
her own knowledge of Jim’s past career in a delicately formulated way, taking account of 
Jim’s epistemic rights (‘if I’m right in saying was that for an air-conditioning…’). This lexical 
prompt displaying the questioner’s K+ status is only built into the question once Jim has 
himself named his own profession. Doing this type of reminiscence talk displays the 
sensitivity with which speakers manage any possible epistemic incongruence. The 
interactional task is to support a person’s epistemic right to their own life domain, while 
running the risk that a prompt will imply that the questioner might know more about the 
other’s life than they do themselves. We have several examples where the third position turn 
reveals the ‘known answer’ status of the question (Heritage, 2018: 30); for instance, on one 
occasion a man is asked for the name of his wife, and after pausing he does supply a name, 
which is then repeated by the facilitator, with a ‘that’s right’. This pattern seems very much 
like a memory test (Hellerman, 2005). Epistemic intrusion can be a sensitive matter, and the 
precise point in the sequence when this occurs seems to depend on Jim’s success in finally 
giving a preferred response to the original question about his job.  
4.3 Using a type two knowable to elicit claims to knowledge 
Unlikely or creative accounts of one’s past life again figure in the following, where the 
importance of sequential positioning is even clearer. The precise point at which questions 
are asked to prompt memories is important for Jim in Extract 2. It is also important for Rob in 
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the following sequence; unlike the attempt to launch in with a ‘Do you remember?’ question, 
preceding Extract 3, Rob’s identity as a piano player has been roundly emphasised 
throughout the interaction. Jan has spent some time showing Rob some piano music, and 
asking him what the notes mean, when she finally asks him a specific question about Kenya 
at line 26.  
 
Extract 3 Playing the ivories 
 
01 Rob  it’s called playing the ivories  
02 Jan   ((hand movements as if playing the piano)) 
03 Jan  play - tinkling the ivories yeah (0.3) 
04 Rob  and we know where the ivories come from 
05 Jan  yeeah er (.)afric - african elephants  
06 Rob  yeah 
07 Jan  ↑ye↓ah(.) I don’t think they ↑do  
08    I don’t think they’re made  
09    of ivory any more I think they’re probably  
10    just the old ones made of ivory now 
11 Rob  ((nods head))yes when we were in Kenya 
12 Jan  ↑ye::ah 
13 Rob  there was a concert or- organised by (.) 
14    er um (0.2) you know they all (.) 
15 Jan  travel arrangements travel agents 
16 Rob  suddenly got (0.1)even the Queen when  
17    she was there  
18 Jan  ↑yes 
19 Rob  and the – the girl guides  
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20 Jan  ↑o:h ↓right  
21 Rob  em er and I was in the - 
22 Jan  boy scouts ↑yea 
23 Rob  yes (.)and er (0.1) you know they say   
24    ‘give us a tu::ne’ 
25    ((plays with fingers as if on piano)) 
26 Jan → oooh Rob you know when you know when you  
27    went to Kenya 
28 Rob  yes 
29 Jan  and you’re saying about about the queen  
30    in Kenya (.)are  you thinking of of  
31    Treetops 
32 Rob  (.)  
33    yes that’s where they stayed at 
34 Jan  yeah the Kenyan resort where the queen stayed 
35    did you ↑go to Treetops 
36 Rob  well I (0.2) er the thing is that all my (0.3)  
37    sepia (0.1) 
38 Jan  yes 
39 Rob  photos are pretty awkward [for me 
40 Jan          [yes to look at 
41 Rob   and I played the piano (0.1) er and I I er 
42    talked to er (.) the Queen  
43 Jan  yes (sits back with a smile) 
44 Rob  when she was a girl  
45 Jan   yeah 
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Rob’s talk about ‘playing the ivories’ is taken up by his conversational partner, Jan, who 
replaces the term used by Rob by the idiomatic expression ‘tinkling the ivories’, oriented to 
by both as a reference to a phrase which might jokingly be used about a musician. Note that 
this plays here to Rob’s epistemic primacy, not only to have greater knowledge about his 
own life, but also about the terms and issues associated with the domain of piano playing. 
His next turn also orients to his greater level of access to piano playing, as it is Rob who 
produces the next first pair part in line 4 ‘and we know where the ivories come from’. The ‘we 
know’ as a preamble puts Jan in second position, but simultaneously refers obliquely to a 
possible past sharing of information, something that Jan should be able to recall. The roles 
of questioner and respondent have at this point been reversed.  
It is Jan then who provides a response to Rob’s question, in starting to discuss where ivory 
now comes from, but her turn works around neatly to another turn slot for Rob, by her 
reference to ‘just the old ones made of ivory’. Rob’s embodied yes (a nod) immediately takes 
this up, and he then shifts the topic stepwise (Jefferson, 1984) using what Jefferson 
identified as a pivotal utterance to form the new topic. The topic of African ivory is effectively 
closed with the nod and the ‘yes’ at line 10, which opens up the topic of ‘when we were in 
Kenya’. Note Jan’s ‘ye::ah’ in response, orienting to this shift as potentially relevant to the 
matter under discussion.  
So far, what is remarkable in this extract is Rob’s continued dominance of first-position turns. 
Down to line 27, Jan is constantly in second position and responds minimally to Rob’s talk, 
orienting to Rob’s epistemic primacy and her own relative lack of knowledge. It is at line 27 
that this changes, at the point where she uses a slight pause to self-select in order to direct 
Rob towards some more specific talk about his experiences with the Queen in Kenya. 
Effectively, she uses the same strategy here as we have already noted elsewhere, and 
which is illustrated by Sandra in Extract 2, where the reference is to a shared conversation, 
something which both parties are called on to remember:  
27 Jan   Rob you know when you know when you went to Kenya 
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28 Rob  yes 
29 Jan  and you’re saying about about the queen  
30    in Kenya (.)are  you thinking of of  
31    Treetops 
32 Rob  (.) yes that’s where they stayed at 
Since the conversation about Kenya has been introduced by Rob himself a few lines earlier, 
this ‘type 2 knowable’ does not have the same thrust as Sandra’s in Extract 2. It is more 
perhaps a display of ongoing understanding of the present conversation, something that is 
routinely done to demonstrate and reinforce intersubjective understanding, by providing a 
‘gist’ or summary of what is being said. What moves it into maybe a wider or past frame of 
reference here is the explicit mention of ‘Treetops’. While it may be publicly available 
information that the Queen stayed at ‘Treetops’ it is unlikely that both Jan and Rob would 
know this unless they had talked about it previously. Whatever the case, the 
acknowledgement by Rob in line 28 allows Jan to carry on to not only summarise Rob’s 
previous story, but to clarify his reference to the Queen, to her staying at Treetops, and then 
to the possibility that Rob as a boy scout may have also gone to the same place.  
 
There is evidence here that Rob hears this line of questioning as some kind of verification of 
his story, since his response is not to agree or disagree that he went to Treetops, but to refer 
to the physical evidence of the photos he possesses from his childhood. Just like a witness 
in court proceedings (Sidnell, 2010) Rob accounts for his inability to verify this memory. 
However, he soon moves back to a straightforward assertion that he both played the piano, 
and talked to the Queen as a girl. This response at lines 36-39 re-casts Jan’s question ‘Did 
you go to Treetops?’ as implying that if he could agree that he was in the same place as the 
Queen, his account of playing the piano for her might indeed be circumstantially reliable. As 
with some other story-tellers (Williams, 2006), when people’s accounts run the risk of being 
taken as unreliable or fantastical, one way of managing this is for a speaker to supply 
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circumstantial, locational and dramatic detail around the veracity of their claim. In the present 
context, then, in talk involving a person with dementia, it seems that in Extract 3 epistemic 
primacy might be something that needs to be achieved, indeed jointly accomplished, rather 
than simply assumed. Jan’s previous discussion with Rob about his life, her prior knowledge, 
and her skilful questioning here have enabled Rob, with very few narrative resources of his 
own, to develop a picture of a particular moment in his past. So much depends on the 
sequence, the positioning of specific questions and prompts in the wider interaction and 
activity of the moment.  
 
4.4 Displaying epistemic primacy by rejecting the premise of a question 
When type 2 knowables (i.e. past, shared information) are routinely used in these contexts to 
prompt or elicit personal memory talk, that can occur in the service of diverse activities in the 
here-and-now (Buchanan and Middleton, 1995). In Rob and Jan’s case, the activity involved 
looking through piano music, and some time had been spent in Rob demonstrating to Jan 
how musical notes were to be interpreted. Thus, his own skills as well as memories had 
been on display. In the following extract, the activity in progress was the completion of a 
crossword. Rik is the member of staff, sitting beside Gordon whose gaze is fixed on the 
crossword in his hands.  
Extract 4  
01 Gor letters beginning with T 
02 Rik trade 
03 Gor yeah trade (1) 
04 Rik firing away today 
05 Gor yeah (.) ↑signal. Seven letters (0.5) G (.)  
06   blank N blank blank [blank E 
07 Rik                     [G blank N signal 
08 Gor seven (1) sihgnal (.) uhm (2) 
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09 Rik →you weren’t in signals ↑were you? ha ha 
10 Gor →no I weren’t in signals  
11 Rik (…) 
12 Gor →transport mate transport 
13 Rik transport 
14 Gor yes 
15 Rik we’ll come back to that 
16 Gor yes logistics mm right okay  
 
As Bolden and Mandelbaum (2017: 26) note, ‘the activity of co-remembering [is] as deeply 
social – not just in terms of what is remembered, but also in terms of the uses for which 
memory can be deployed.’  Here, co-remembering is at the service of completing the 
crossword, which Gordon is holding as he reads out clues to Rik, who is repeating back the 
crossword clue, occasionally giving a candidate answer (as in line 2).  Rik’s remark ‘firing 
away today’ in line 4 is received with a ‘yeah’, as an evaluative commentary on how the 
activity is going, not necessarily an evaluation just of Gordon’s contribution. The crossword 
clue that concerns us here is the one read out by Gordon in lines 5-6, and then repeated 
with some pauses, marking the ongoing nature of Gordon’s thinking about the answer in line 
8 ‘seven (1) sihgnal (.) uhm’.  Rik uses that pause at the end of line 8 to self-select at line 9, 
with a shift to a new action, namely a negatively tilted question about the job which Gordon 
had previously done. The term ‘signals’ which is in the crossword clue becomes a pivot on 
which to form this stepwise move. Using a word which is being discussed in a crossword or 
quiz may of course be heard as a device to help solve the clue, orienting Gordon to the 
possibility of solving the clue by thinking about his past experience. Rik’s laughter could 
indicate that the question was premised on Gordon’s privileged access to this field of 
knowledge, and Gordon’s subsequent denial that he was ‘in signals’ (line 10) although 
aligned in terms of preference with the question, reframes his past job as ‘transport’. 
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Effectively, in this activity context, Gordon justifies his inability to find the crossword clue for 
‘signals’. 
Thus, we can see how talk about someone else’s past life can be elicited by a K+ 
questioner, albeit using question formats which are tentative, negatively tilted and which 
exhibit sensitivity in honouring the other person’s epistemic primacy. In fact, there is nothing 
specifically in the talk which could alert us to the fact that one of these participants (Gordon) 
is a client with a dementia diagnosis, while Rik is an occupational therapist. The only 
suggestion of their roles may be in the orientation Rik shows towards reminding Gordon of 
his work life, and making it relevant to the present activity. However, Gordon’s quick 
reformulation and naming of his own job do identity work by positioning him as a competent 
conversationalist, as well as having been a competent transport worker. The ‘co-constructed 
performance’ in Crichton and Koch’s (2011) terms can be seen here in action, and the 
opportunity afforded Gordon to discuss his own version of his life history is created both by 
the tentativeness of Rik’s question, but also by the evident link it has with the activity context 
in which it emerges. Talk about reminiscence can be seen to have a function in the here-
and-now, and is always as Bolden and Mandelbaum (2017) suggest, ‘deeply social’.  
5. Discussion 
This paper has highlighted some of the ways in which co-remembering can be used as a 
resource to prompt reminiscences, particularly when the other speaker shows evidence of 
problems in remembering details which are in their own epistemic domain. Specifically, we 
have examined the interactional trouble that can occur when questions of the ‘Do you 
remember’ variety seek a naming response; conversely, the use of questions which rely on 
Type 2 knowables (Pomerantz, 1980), or references to past, shared conversations, can be a 
more productive resource in these contexts. Parties in the talk regularly orient to the precise 
positioning of these questions in the flow of the talk, and both speakers display particular 
sensitivity to epistemic rights and primacy. 
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Such a strategy of referring to co-remembered information via a previous shared 
conversation is not specific to dementia contexts. Anyone might remind someone else that 
they had previously mentioned a particular matter, or they might make it clear in their 
question that the other speaker had disclosed something to them. One could speculate that 
these indirect means of prompting reminiscence might be chosen when there is more 
likelihood of forgetting, rather than the direct face-threatening ‘Can you remember’ 
questions. One of the interesting reflections arising from this paper is therefore the parallel 
with this phenomenon as it appears in other contexts, to accomplish different actions. In 
courtroom witness interrogation, Sidnell (2010) shows how yes/no questions to establish the 
facts are regularly followed up by further probes (wh-questions) about the details of an 
event. This pattern is remarkably similar to that explored in Extract 2 in the current paper, 
where Jim’s naming of his own past job was immediately followed by some more probes to 
explore his memories. While we are not drawing direct comparisons between these contexts, 
the parallel between the patterns of questioning is of interest. It is remarkable how questions 
can become extremely face-threatening,  when they imply that a speaker does not have 
access to his or her own past life story, and no amount of re-structuring can really eliminate 
that effect.  
Managing veracity claims is an ever-present task for these interlocutors, as for instance 
when a speaker mentions interacting with the Queen as part of his life story.  As in Lindholm 
(2015), talk with people with dementia can be fraught with ‘confabulations’ or matters which 
seem either fantastical or unlikely, but is also perfectly possible in mundane conversations 
outside institutional settings. Lindholm (ibid) found that interlocutors managed these 
moments in the conversation in many different ways, and the current paper adds to that 
array by showing how a skilled interlocutor can deflect the talk towards some shared, related 
topic which is in the public domain, thus re-positioning the other as a reliable speaker, with a 
relevant and believable narrative. That can be done either by re-casting the original story as 
factually possible, by re-directing the speaker towards another version of his story, or by 
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referring to related information, thus maintaining topical relevance. All of this is both about 
keeping a conversation going, while also doing the work of respecting and enhancing what 
someone else says about their life (Crichton and Koch, 2011). Matters of face management 
are always present in these conversations.  
As Bolden and Mandelbaum (2017) point out, co-remembering is not necessarily done for its 
own sake, but is often carried out in the service of other interactional goals, to verify some 
information, solve an argument, or complete a story for a third party. In the data analysed 
here, we have seen reminiscence talk occur informally within other activities, where the goal 
might be to complete a practical task such as gardening, or to decide on a pub visit. In the 
current paper, we showed how a crossword puzzle could give rise to a question which 
probed someone’s past employment history. Unlike the more formal ‘reminiscence therapy’ 
sessions, activity contexts such as this can allow a range of responses to be taken as 
functionally adequate, relevant, or even consequential for the task.  
It is well established that speakers are treated as having the right to narrate their own 
experiences and to know and describe their own thoughts (Heritage & Raymond, 2005; 
Pomerantz, 1980; Sacks, 1984). These rights are part of what Shakespeare (1998) 
described as membership rights, and speakers routinely achieve current, here-and-now 
identity status (what Zimmerman, 1998 referred to as ‘discourse identity’) via such personal 
narration. However, in some contexts, as this paper shows, these rights have to be 
navigated carefully and tactfully, and this navigation is visible in how each turn is taken up in 
subsequent talk. Epistemic rights can overlap and interweave, when one speaker’s 
memories of their own life are challengeable by others. This situation results in both 
speakers having to navigate the epistemic space by placing themselves in a K- position, 
even when subsequent turns demonstrate their shared knowledge. This allows the first 
speaker to own his or her story, as well as creating space within which the framework of co-
remembering can be filled in, confirmed or disconfirmed. 
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The data on which this paper is based arises from a study about disabling practices, where 
we are concerned to identify how practices are ‘ordered’ precisely because that interactional 
order may be shown to be exclusionary, or could become more inclusive. We hope therefore 
to add to the stocks of professional knowledge with the current findings about epistemic 
primacy, references to past conversations and the importance of doing reminiscence talk in 
the service of other tasks and activities. More than anything, the speakers in our data 
showed sensitivity to the precise moment in the talk to introduce a question, while designing 
their next turn very carefully to attune it to what the other speaker had just said. The concept 
of ‘recipient design’ not only threads through CA, but is a very relevant matter for dementia 
talk, and CA findings may help practitioners to operationalise that concept in practice.  
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